Just a couple of days ago, Reuters reported that Pfizer “…is winning attention from some of the savviest hedge funds thanks to high-tech drugs and vaccines that it got when it paid $68 billion for Wyeth.” OK, I get it that it’s all about THE PIPELINE and buying Wyeth put quite a few new potential (nest) eggs in Pfizer’s basket. But here’s the rub: That portfolio of eggs is now going to be nurtured by the Pfizer organization, not Wyeth. Hmmm, this is the same organization that paid a whopping $1.3 B for Esperion Therapeutics in 2004 and then walked away with a $426 MM tax benefit in 2008. And this is same company which invested $800 MM in a clinical program for Torcetrapib (the cholesterol agent which might not have been the best pick of the litter, but was the fastest track to market) only to see it blow up in Phase 3 in a spectacular manner due to safety issues. And, yes, these same decision-makers brought Exubera to market, the $2.8 B debacle in the insulin/diabetes market, a product apparently plagued with manufacturing, device and price issues, just to mention a few. And today we hear that Pfizer-Medivation’s dimebon for Alzheimer’s failed to differentiate from placebo in a Phase 3 trial. Another spectacular melt-down for Pfizer.
Now, it is possible that some strange anomaly occurred in this trial and it will be interesting to see Pfizer’s next moves to investigate the formulation, patient recruitment, etc. But barring any mystical solution to explain the failed Phase 3 results, one really needs to ask what was going on in their due diligence prior to entering the deal with Medivation. Many investors surely trusted Pfizer’s experts to examine the Russian Phase 2 trials and data, as well as the animal studies that formed the basis of the Phase 3 program. Was their due diligence flawed? Or was the pressure to fill THE PIPELINE so great that various and sundry decision-makers felt compelled to “deliver a Phase 3 product”. Given Pfizer’s checkered history with shareholders over the last several years, the pressure to “do something” was surely enormous, and Pfizer’s classical style is to buy their way into a pipeline (so long Warner Lambert, Pharmacia, Wyeth and others).
Hedge funds beware…sometimes a post-mortem assessment on management decision-making (and corporate culture) can uncover some underlying flaws that belie the apparent “undervalued” assets. For my money, I’m not too comfortable with desperate management making decisions about an R&D portfolio. And if you look to track records, Esperion, Exubera, Torcetrapib and now Medivation represent a pretty scary set of examples. Pfizer appears to be running too fast to catch up and ask what their vision and strategy are. What is needed is a ‘pause’…not a leap into generics to pile on another acquisition (Ratiopharm).